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Seven dimensions for gauging the real-world fallout of infrastructure cyberattacks

Researchers at Carleton University's Cyber Security Evaluation and Assurance (CyberSEA) lab argue that defending critical infrastructure requires studying what happens after a breach, not only how to prevent one. Alvi Jawad, Jason Jaskolka and colleagues have set out seven dimensions for describing the consequences of cyberattacks on physical systems, published as a systematic review in the International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection.

From prevention to consequence

Most cybersecurity analysis asks how an attack could have been stopped. Impact analysis starts from the assumption that a system has already been compromised. It asks which operations fail, how the effects spread and who or what is harmed.

The authors stress that infrastructure should be treated as a wider system, not a set of devices. A water utility, for example, includes pumps and control software, but it also supports treatment processes, public health, the environment and access to safe water. Critical infrastructure spans ten broad sectors, among them energy, water, health, transportation and food, and connecting these systems to the internet brings efficiency alongside exposure to modern threats.

Seven dimensions of impact

The framework separates consequences into categories that build on one another:

  • Operational: the system can no longer perform its intended function.
  • Physical: equipment or materials are altered or damaged.
  • Safety: people are exposed to hazards such as fire or unsafe food.
  • Environmental: air, water, land or ecosystems are harmed.
  • Economic: products, repairs, downtime and customers are lost.
  • Societal: communities lose access to important goods and services.
  • Reputational: public confidence in an organisation or service erodes.

The authors note that these dimensions are linked. A single disrupted operation can produce several kinds of impact at once, and some persist after the technical fault has been fixed.

Illustrations from supermarkets and sewage

The authors use recent attacks on European supermarkets as a worked example. According to their account, attackers remotely reprogrammed internet-connected temperature controls, switching evaporators to defrost mode. In France in October, refrigeration temperatures in more than 350 stores reportedly rose to 50 C, spoiling food, overheating equipment and, in some cases, causing fires. Similar disruptions were then reported in several other European countries. All seven dimensions can be traced in these events, from the operational failure of refrigeration to lost trust over food safety.

The team also simulated cyberattacks on a Canadian municipal wastewater treatment facility. The simulated attacks could push equipment to run excessively or close to safety limits, raise chemical consumption, force costly contingency modes or disrupt chemical dosing. The most serious scenario involved undertreated wastewater being discharged into the city's river. The authors point to the Maroochy Shire incident in Australia in 2000, when a former employee interfered remotely with sewage pumping stations and millions of gallons of untreated sewage reached waterways and parks, as evidence that such a scenario is not purely hypothetical.

Limits and relevance

The source is a summary written by the researchers, so it gives few details of the simulation method or its assumptions. The wastewater findings come from one facility and should not be assumed to transfer directly to other plants or sectors. The published work is a review of dimensions and metrics, not an empirical test of the framework against a large set of real incidents.

The framework's value is mainly practical. A shared vocabulary for consequences lets operators and regulators ask which outcomes are unacceptable, where extra safeguards are needed, who must respond to safety or environmental harm and which services should be restored first. It also points researchers towards the metrics needed to quantify cyber-to-physical impact, which the review examines.

The underlying position is that preventing intrusions is necessary but not sufficient. Planning should also assume that defences will sometimes fail and aim to keep essential services running when they do.

Source: How we can prepare for future cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (Tech Xplore, 19 November 2026).

Image: AI-generated illustration.

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